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M Cathleen Kaveny*
I. INTRODUCTION
At the center of the cover of Human Cloning and Human Dignity stands a
human fingerprint. In his foreword, Leon Kass comments on the significance
of the image for the Report produced by the Commission he chairs:
The fingerprint has rich biological and moral significance.
Made by a human hand, it exhibits our common humanity.
Distinctively individuated, it signifies our unique personal
identity. Left behind on objects we handle, it is a telltale
sign of individual responsibility, sometimes of guilt. The
advent of human cloning and other genetic technologies
means that we human beings may soon be putting our hands
on our own genetic endowment, in ways that will affect the
humanity and identity of our children and our children's
children. A novel responsibility is now upon us: to decide
whether or not it is wise for us to grasp this awesome power
over future generations, and if so, under what conditions.
This book, Human Cloning and Human Dignity: The Report
of the President's Council on Bioethics, seeks to equip us for
that responsibility by making clear just what is at stake.'
For the reasons that Kass proffers, the human fingerprint is indeed an
appropriate symbol for the subject matter of the Report. It needs to be said,
however, that the particular image of a fingerprint on its cover is an
appropriate symbol for the particular shape and manner in which that subject
* M. Cathleen Kaveny is John P. Murphy Foundation Professor of Law and Professor of Theology at
the University of Notre Dame.1 LEON KASS, Foreword to PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN
DIGNITY, at XIII (2000).
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matter is addressed within the Report. In its presentation, this particular
fingerprint is both familiar and ominous in its appearance. It is traced in an
eerie, fluorescent blue ink against a shiny, pitch-black background, conjuring
images from CSI and other darkly glossy forensically-based crime dramas
currently dominating the television airwaves. Like similar images flashed on
the screen in such dramas, the image on the cover moves the observer by
appealing to the emotions as well as the intellect, generating a full-bodied
response to the subject matter that is generally not produced by abstract
argument or analysis. This type of response can, however, be produced by
words as well as images. The art of producing such a response was the focus
of the ancient art of rhetoric, defined by Aristotle as the faculty of observing
in any given case the available means of persuasion. 2 A key component of
classical education, the study of rhetoric fell out of scholarly favor during the
first half of the twentieth century. In the past twenty-five years, however, it
has been the recipient of renewed interest from both literary critics and
philosophers.3
Nonetheless, not many articles or books in contemporary public
philosophy or bioethics would stand out for their rhetorical style. This does
not mean, of course, that they are devoid of all rhetorical concern. Authors
generally want to lead their readers to view the subject matter at hand in the
same way that they do. Most philosophers and bioethicists tacitly assume that
the only legitimate (and ideally, the only effective) grounds of persuasion are
analysis and linear argument; they therefore structure their work according to
the demands of a deliberate rhetorical minimalism. In contrast, Human
Cloning and Human Dignity is not rhetorically minimalistic. It is in fact
notable for the way in which it uses verbal imagery, sometimes drawn from
literature, to persuade the reader to view the practice of human cloning from a
particular vantage point.
More specifically, the Council's Report attempts to engage not only the
reader's analytical abilities, but also her imagination and her emotions, to
encourage her to respond in an integrated human way to what all of the
members of the Council believe to be a broadly human question, not merely a
technical or scientific one. Despite their different perspectives, in looking at
human cloning, the Council members are united in seeing a problem that
"touches fundamental aspects of our humanity." 4 The ominous but familiar
2 ARISTOTLE, THE "ART" OF RHETORIC 15 (G.P. Goold ed., John Henry Freese trans., Harv. Univ.
Press 1994).
3 GEORGE A. KENNEDY, CLASSICAL RHETORIC & ITS CHRISTIAN AND SECULAR TRADITION FROM
ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMES 293-96 (2d ed. 1999).
4 PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, HUMAN CLONING AND HUMAN DIGNITY, at XL (2002).
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quality of the fingerprint on the cover aptly symbolizes the Council's view of
a society which accepts the practice of producing children through the cloning
process, a practice which they unanimously reject. That ominous tone
suffuses the discussion of other uses of cloned embryos, even though the
Council was much more divided about the ultimate acceptability of such uses.
The first point of contention regarding the Report, therefore, will be about
its rhetoric-its striking intermixture of style and substance. In the chapter on
the "Historical Aspects of Cloning," the Report includes a section entitled:
"Human Cloning from Popular Literature to Public Policy: From Brave New
World to Dolly." The Report itself rightly notes, "the relevance or irrelevance
of Huxley's vision to the dilemmas of the present is of course a matter of
serious disagreement.",5 But it wrongly casts the linchpin disagreement
exclusively in terms of the accuracy or inaccuracy of Huxley's predictions of
a future in which science has run amok.
Science fiction is a form of literature, and it is not a social horoscope.
While its setting is the imagined future, the issues it raises are in reality rooted
in the author's own time and place. The more fundamental disputed question
is whether, in addition to cost-benefit analysis and rights-talk, the insights of
great works of literature (whether they are science fiction or another genre)
are also relevant to our collective moral deliberations. As I suggest in more
detail below, Cloning and Human Dignity is noteworthy for the affirmative
response that it gives to this fundamental question.
II. CONTEXT
In August 2001, President George W. Bush announced his decision to
allow the restricted use of federal funds for research involving stem cells
obtained from human embryos.6 At the same time, he announced his intent to
create a President's Council on Bioethics, to be chaired by Leon Kass. An
eminent ethicist who had been dually trained as a medical doctor and a
biologist, Kass had long taught "great books" through the Committee on
Social Thought at the University of Chicago. The Council, whose other
members were not named until November of that year,7 took up as its first
Id. at 27 (2002).
6 President Bush decided that federal funds could be used to support research on the approximately
sixty stem cell lines already in existence, "where the life-and death-decision has already been made," but
that it could not be used to support research entailing the creation of new stem cell lines, which would
involve the destruction of additional human embryos. See President George W. Bush, Remarks by the
President on Stem Cell Research from Crawford, Tex. (Aug. 9, 2001) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/08/ 2 0 0 10809-2.html).
7 They included: Elizabeth H. Blackburn, Department of Biochemistry and Biophysics, University of
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project the topic of human cloning. In a certain respect, the choice of this
topic was obvious. Since the appearance of Dolly the cloned sheep in 1997,
the question of human cloning had received intense public and scholarly
attention in the United States and abroad. In another respect, however, their
efforts may have seemed redundant. Two substantial reports on cloning had
already been produced by government bodies, one by the National Bioethics
Advisory Commission soon after Dolly's appearance in 1997,8 and the other
by the National Academy of Sciences in 2002. 9 Was there any academic
reason to devote scarce governmental resources to yet another report on the
same topic?
Those academics already inclined to be suspicious of Washington power
politics could note, for example, that the National Bioethics Advisory
Commission had been constituted by President Clinton in 1995,10 and that
President Bush had allowed its charter to lapse before putting in place his own
President's Council on Bioethics.11 Was the Bush Council's Report simply
one more attempt by a victorious political party to "erase" the work product of
the losing political party and substitute its own work product instead? One
would have to be naive to suggest that party politics played no role, or even
an insignificant role, in Bush's constitution of a new deliberative body on
bioethics. Nonetheless, it is clear that the Report of the Bush Council is by no
means academically redundant, since it framed its task very differently than
did the Clinton Commission, in two important respects.
First, the Report produced by the Clinton Commission was narrowly
California-San Francisco; Stephen L. Carter, Yale Law School; Rebecca S. Dresser, Washington University
School of Law and Washington University School of Medicine; Daniel W. Foster, Department of Internal
Medicine, University of Texas Southwestern Medical School; Francis Fukuyama, Paul H. Nitze School of
Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University; Michael S. Gazzaniga, Center for Cognitive
Neuroscience, Dartmouth College; Robert P. George, Department of Politics, Princeton University; Mary
Ann Glendon, Harvard Law School; Alfonso G6mez-Lobo, Department of Philosophy, Georgetown
University; William Hurlbut, Department of Biology, Stanford University; Charles Krauthammer, a
prominent syndicated columnist; William F. May, an emeritus professor of ethics at Southern Methodist
University; Paul McHugh, Department of Psychiatry, Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine;
Gilbert C. Meilaender, Department of Theology, Valparaiso University; Janet D. Rowley, Pritzker School
of Medicine, University of Chicago; Michael Sandel, Department of Government, Harvard University;
James Q. Wilson, emeritus professor of management and public policy, University of California-Los
Angeles. See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Names Members of Bioethics Council
(Jan. 16, 2002) (available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020116-9.html).
8 NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, CLONING HUMAN BEINGS (1997), available at
http://www.georgetown.edu/research/nrcbl/nbac/pubs/cloningl/cloning.pdf.
9 NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, SCIENTIFIC AND MEDICAL ASPECTS OF HUMAN REPRODUCTIVE
CLONING (2002), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309076374/html.
10 President Clinton constituted the National Bioethics Advisory Commission by Executive Order.
See Exec. Order No. 12,975, 60 Fed. Reg. 56,063 (Oct. 3, 1995).
" The charter of Clinton's National Bioethics Advisory Commission expired on October 3, 2001. See
Exec. Order No. 13,137, 64 Fed. Reg. 50,733 (Sept. 15, 1999).
[VoI.XX:489
Rhetoric, Public Reason, and Bioethics
focused on the use of the cloning technique to produce a live baby, which
would involve using the procedure of somatic cell nuclear transfer (the most
common way to perform the cloning procedure) to generate a human embryo
in vitro, and then the transfer of that embryo to the womb of a willing woman
for gestation and birth.12 The Bush Council extensively addresses this use of
cloning, which it denominates as cloning-to-produce-children. Yet the Bush
Council also considers a second use of cloning not treated in the.Clinton
Commission Report, which it calls cloning-for-biomedical research.' 3 Under
this scenario, the procedure of somatic cell nuclear transfer is used to produce
a live human embryo, which is then grown in the laboratory for several days,
until it develops an inner cell mass containing embryonic stem cells. Unlike
most human cells, stem cells are believed capable of becoming differentiated
into any cell in the human body. Embryonic stem cells in particular are
believed by biomedical researchers to hold great (but still uncertain) promise
for studying and treating certain genetic diseases. Nonetheless, the use of
such cells is highly controversial since the process of isolating them
invariably destroys the embryo.
Second, the Clinton Commission Report and the Bush Council Report
differ significantly in basic orientation with respect to the general topic of
cloning. This difference, in my view, can be traced to the differences in the
charges given in the executive orders creating the two bodies. The executive
order forming the Clinton Commission makes it clear that their major task
was to advise federal lawmakers about appropriate legislation, regulation, and
policy regarding sensitive bioethical issues) 4 Consequently, the chapters in
12 Cloning is a type of asexual reproduction. Natural human reproduction, as occurring as a result of
sexual intercourse, involves the combination of a sperm cell (with 23 chromosomes) and an egg cell (with
23 chromosomes) to form a human zygote (with a full complement of46 chromosomes). Consequently, the
genetic makeup of a new human normally includes material from both its mother and its father and is
identical to the genetic makeup of neither. The genetic makeup of babies conceived through in vitro
fertilization is similarly constituted; in their case, the sperm and the egg combine in a laboratory petri dish
or test tube rather than in the mother's fallopian tube. In contrast, human cloning involves taking the
nucleus from a donor's somatic cell, which has 46 chromosomes (only egg and sperm cells have 23
chromosomes), injecting it into an enucleated egg, and stimulating cell division (usually by the application
of an electric current). The resulting embryo will have essentially the same genetic makeup of the donor of
the somatic cell (a small amount of genetic material is contained in the mitochondria of the egg donor).
13 The Clinton Commission considered some of the relevant issues in conjunction with its second
report. See NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, ETHICAL ISSUES IN HUMAN STEM CELL RESEARCH
(1999), available at http://www.georgetown.edu/research/nrcbl/nbac/pubs.html.
14 Section 4 of Executive Order 12,975, 60 Fed. Reg. 52,063 (Oct. 3, 1995), specifies:
(a) NBAC shall provide advice and make recommendations to the National Science
and Technology Council and to other appropriate government entities regarding the
following matters:
1. the appropriateness of departmental, agency, or other governmental programs,
policies, assignments, missions, guidelines, and regulations as they relate to
2004]
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the Clinton Report discussing various religious and secular perspectives on
the morality of cloning are best viewed as the prolegomena to its key chapter,
which focuses on making law and policy on a controversial subject in a
pluralistic society. 15 In contrast, the Executive Order creating the Bush
Council provides a very different orientation for the discussion, calling upon
the Council members to advise the President, and to initiate a national
conversation, on the moral meaning and broad implications for our culture
and the common good of emerging issues in biomedicine.' 6  The moral
reflection in the Bush Council Report is not a necessary prolegomenon to
policymaking; it is the heart and soul of the Council's concern. In contrast,
the chapters on law and policy seem to be almost an appendix.
III. CONTENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Bush Council Report contains seven chapters. Chapter One gives an
overview of the topic, situating human cloning within its context as a
potential form of human reproduction and as a tool of biomedical research.
bioethical issues arising from research on human biology and behavior; and
2. applications, including the clinical applications, of that research.
(b) NBAC shall identify broad principles to govern the ethical conduct of research,
citing specific projects only as illustrations for such principles.
(c) NBAC shall not be responsible for the review and approval of specific projects.
(d) In addition to responding to requests for advice and recommendations from the
National Science and Technology Council, NBAC also may accept suggestions of
issues for consideration from both the Congress and the public. NBAC also may
identify other bioethical issues for the purpose of providing advice and
recommendations, subject to the approval of the National Science and Technology
Council.
1S I argue elsewhere that a major flaw of the Clinton Commission Report is its uncritical reliance on a
particular form of liberal legal theory in its approach to this question. Other forms of liberal legal theory
might have yielded a different approach, not to mention non-liberal legal theories that also value autonomy.
See M. Cathleen Kaveny, The NBAC Report on Cloning: A Case Study in Religion, Public Policy, and
Bioethics, in FAITH AT THE FRONTIERS (David Guinn ed.) (forthcoming).
16 Section 2(a) of Executive Order 13,237, 66 Fed. Reg. 59,851 (Nov. 28, 2001), states:
The Council shall advise the President on bioethical issues that may emerge as a
consequence of advances in biomedical science and technology. In connection with
its advisory role, the mission of the Council includes the following functions:
1. to undertake fundamental inquiry into the human and moral significance of
developments in biomedical and behavioral science and technology;
2. to explore specific ethical and policy questions related to these developments;
3. to provide a forum for a national discussion of bioethical issues;
4. to facilitate a greater understanding of bioethical issues; and
5. to explore possibilities for useful international collaboration on bioethical issues.
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Chapter Two examines the history of the debate over human cloning, which
emerged as a topic of reflection and debate among moralists and novelists
long before the development of technology able to produce a human clone
seemed as imminent as it does to us now. Chapter Three is devoted to the
development of "fair and accurate terminology,"'17 admonishing the reader
about the importance of the "careful use of names"' 8 and justifying the
Council's choice to analyze its subject matter in terms of the categories
"cloning-to-produce-children" and "cloning-for-biomedical research."
Chapter Four gives the scientific background of cloning; its account is
generally clear, but in my view, slightly less accessible to the nonspecialist
than the parallel chapter in the Clinton Commission Report. Chapters Five
and Six constitute the core of the Bush Council Report. The fifth chapter is
devoted to the ethics of cloning-to-produce children, and the sixth is devoted
to cloning-for-biomedical-research. Both chapters present the arguments for
and against cloning in a vigorous and spirited way. Chapter Seven outlines
the various public policy options, while Chapter Eight develops in more detail
the two policy options adopted by various members of the Council. An
appendix to the Report includes personal statements submitted by fourteen of
the eighteen council members.' 9 The Report also includes an executive
summary, a glossary of terms, and a bibliography.
No one could accuse the Council of attempting to paper over differences of
opinion, in theory or in practice. In fact, one could say that Council members
courted such differences. Only after evaluating the strongest arguments in
favor of cloning-to-produce children (some of which had been developed in
the Clinton Commission Report) did the Council unanimously find that
practice to be morally unacceptable. In addition to the obvious problem of
safety (which was the linchpin of the Clinton Commission's advocacy of a
prohibition against cloning-to-produce-children), the Council identifies
several other moral factors which, in its view, militate against producing a
child through somatic cell nuclear transfer. They include potential problems
of identity and individuality facing the cloned child; concern that the practice
of human cloning would treat children like "products" subject to parental
control rather than "gifts" whom their parents owe unconditional acceptance;
the prospect of a new eugenics (including the possibility that cloning would
be used to perpetuate favored genotypes or genetically enhanced individuals);
the confusion of familial relations (e.g., an adult could be both the genetic
7 PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 4, at XLII.
I Id. at41.
'9 Stephen Carter, Francis Fukuyama, and Mary Ann Glendon did not submit statements. The
chairman, Leon Kass, also did not submit a personal statement, but wrote a foreword to the entire Report.
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twin and social parent of a cloned child ); and broader, unknown effects on
society as a whole, including the way adults look at the next generation.20
In contrast, the diverging opinions expressed by the Council regarding the
morality of cloning-for-biomedical research were more than theoretical; on
this question, Council members were actually deeply divided. Several
members of the Council maintain that such cloning is morally impermissible,
because it would result in the destruction of the human embryo, whom they
believe deserves respect as a member of the human community from the
moment of fertilization. Distinct concerns (which some members believe
would justify a ban even apart from a high assessment of the status and rights
of the embryo) include the exploitation of nascent human life (indisputably
the "seeds" of the next generation), the exploitation of women as egg donors,
and the increased likelihood that cloning-to-produce children would occur as
a result of the acceptance of the practice of cloning-for-biomedical research.
A second group of Council members believes that such cloning was
morally permissible, because "it may offer uniquely useful ways of
investigating and possibly treating many chronic debilitating diseases and
disabilities, providing aid and relief to millions.",21 At the same time, these
members recognize the moral hazards involved in such research, including
those centered around the early human embryo. Arguing that the embryo has
a moral status intermediate between a mere clump of cells and a human
person, they contend that careful regulation can insure an appropriate level of
respect and provide protection against some of the other concerns raised by
those who oppose cloning-for-biomedical research (e.g., regulation limiting
research to embryos no more than fourteen days old). Moreover, there were
several Council members who supported such research without great ethical
qualms; from their perspective, it "presents no special moral problems, and
therefore should be endorsed with enthusiasm as a potential new means of
gaining knowledge to serve humankind. 22
Not surprisingly, the judgment of the Council on matters of policy
replicated the divisions regarding moral matters. The members were
unanimous in supporting a permanent ban on cloning-to-produce children.
With respect to cloning-for-biomedical-research, ten members voted in favor
of a four-year moratorium, which would give the country time to debate the
issue further and explore the usefulness of adult stem cells with more
thoroughness. Seven members believed cloning-for-biomedical-research
20 PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 4, at XLVII to L, 96-128.
2 id. at LI.
22 Id. at LIII.
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should be allowed to proceed, subject to stringent regulatory oversight. The
Report straightforwardly admits that when they considered each class of
cloning independently, the Council members were evenly divided between
those who would permit cloning-for-biomedical-research now (seven
members) and those who would ban it now (seven members). Initially, only
three members favored a moratorium on cloning-for-biomedical-research.
Clearly, they must have been joined by seven members who would have
preferred to have supported an outright ban.23 Why? The Report does not
explicitly say, but the reader can infer that Council members feared a three-
way split of opinion on the topic would dilute the Council's moral and
political influence, rendering it less likely that any restrictive legislation, even
pertaining to cloning-to-produce-children, would be passed based on its
recommendations.
IV. MORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLIC REASON
In his groundbreaking book After Virtue24, the philosopher Alasdair
Maclntyre observed the breakdown in the possibility for moral reasoning in
contemporary American culture. Taking seemingly impassible debates over
abortion, capital punishment, and affirmative action as his examples, he
observes how the inability to resolve contesting rights claims results in
widespread functional emotivism regarding ethical matters.25 Most people,
that is, treat ethical claims (their own and others') as an expression of a deeply
held irrational feeling about a particular act or practice, rather than as an
intellectually defensible moral judgment about the matter under discussion.
The problem identified by Maclntyre, however, is not limited to popular
opinion; it can also be observed in many of the anthologies used to teach
special ethics, particularly medical ethics, in undergraduate courses. While
most anthologies make an effort to include academic articles presenting "both
sides" of controversial issues, all too frequently the selected articles "talk
past" one another. For example, one academic article will focus on the
morality of abortion, while another will focus upon its appropriate legal status
in a pluralistic society such as our own. I would not be surprised if many
students come out of such courses further convinced of the improbability of
sustained, reasoned discussion about the most neuralgic questions of morality
and public policy.
23 Id. at 228.
24 ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1981).
2 Id. at 6-21.
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In welcome contrast, the Report incorporates a sustained and pointed
discussion and debate about the morality of human cloning. The passages
advocating differing positions do not talk past each other; in fact, the Council
members go to great lengths to address one another's strongest points. In his
foreword, Leon Kass admits: "On several crucial matters, we have in fact
reached consensus. But where we have not, the Council has eagerly agreed to
allow each side to make its own best case, and not only out of politeness for
difference. For it is clear to all of us that each side in the debate has
something vital to defend, not only for itself but for everyone."
26
In my view, the Report will be a valuable addition not only to courses in
bioethics, but also to graduate seminars focusing on contemporary political
philosophy, for three reasons. First, there is no attempt on the part of either
side to distract attention from the costs of their position by changing the
subject; no one pretends that it is possible "to have it all." Those in favor of
cloning-for-biomedical-research recognize and attempt to grapple with the
potential dangers of using "the seeds of the next generation" as scientific raw
material. Those opposed to such cloning do not pretend that it might not have
great benefits in preventing or curing certain diseases.
Second, the Council emphasizes that responsibility for moral discernment
with respect to emerging issues of bioethics falls upon all citizens in our
democratic republic; that responsibility cannot and should not be completely
relegated to "academic experts" in either bioethics or in science.27 At stake in
the questions whether or not to go forward with cloning-to-produce-children
and/or cloning-for-biomedical-research are matters of broad human concern.
In the end, technical expertise in science, bioethics, or any other academic
discipline will not provide us with answers to these questions, no matter how
helpful it may be in an ancillary way. In the end, we need to draw upon broad
26 PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 4, at XIX. In this context, the controversy that
erupted in March 2004 when the President decided not to reappoint two members of the Council, both of
whom supported cloning-for-biomedical-research, was particularly unfortunate. Critics charged that the
decision was politically motivated, in order to create a Council that more uniformly reflected the
President's own views on the status of the human embryo. Kass vigorously denied the charge. Even if the
criticisms of the personnel changes should turn out in the end to be unfounded, the controversy itself will
inevitably contribute to public cynicism about the possibility of good faith debate about neuralgic issues of
morality and law. See, e.g., Elizabeth H. Blackburn (one of the Council members whose term was not
renewed), A "Full Range " of Bioethical Views Just Got Narrower, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 2004, at B2; Leon
Kass, We Don't Play Politics with Science, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2004, at A27.
27 For the President's Council on Bioethics, 'bioethics' refers to the broad domain or subject matter,
rather than to a specialized methodological or academic approach. It is a Council on Bioethics, not a
council ofbioethicists. Council Members come to the domain of bioethics not as 'experts' but simply as
thoughtful human beings who recognize the supreme importance of the issues arising at the many junctions
between biology, biotechnology, and life as humanly lived." PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra
note 4, at XVII.
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and deep practical wisdom, a type of "expertise" in humanity, so to speak. A
crucial presupposition of democratic society is that practical wisdom is not the
exclusive province of those with technical expertise.
Third, the Report might usefully serve as a case study in the debate over
"public reason" begun by John Rawls in his book Political Liberalism.28 That
debate centers on the extent to which citizens morally ought to introduce
religious beliefs or other elements of their worldview that are not universally
shared into debates about law and policy in a pluralistic democratic republic
such as the United States.29 The call for self-censorship regarding the source
of one's politics is by no means uncontroversial; Michael Perry has argued
that it is deeply unfair to religious believers, and I myself have argued that it
is unlikely to further either civic respect or civic peace, which seem to be the
two basic goals advanced by those advocating such self-censorship.3°
Thus far, however, the cases both for and against the restraints of "public
reason" are highly abstract and theoretical.3 ' We have few good examples of
a highly important debate being conducted according to the canons of "public
reason." What would such a debate look like? Would it inevitably be narrow
and constrained, drawing upon the arid language of cost-benefit analysis and
the abstract vocabulary of rights talk? Would there be any way to invoke the
28 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). He modifies his approach in John Rawls, The Idea
of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 768 (1997).
29 MICHAEL PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS, AND LAW (1988); and MICHAEL PERRY, LOVE & POWER:
THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991). Other key books in the debate
include KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988); KENT
GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS (1995); See also John Finnis, Public Reason,
Abortion, and Cloning, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 361. An important anthology is RELIGION AND
CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM (Paul J. Weithman ed., 1997). Michael Perry also organized a conference on
the topic, the papers for which were published in Symposium, Religiously Based Morality: Its Proper Place
in American Law and Public Policy?, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 217 (2001). The debate is about moral
obligations, not legal restrictions: no one has suggested that a legal restriction on the political speech of
religious believers would be consistent with the First Amendment to the Constitution.
30 M. Cathleen Kaveny, Religious Claims and the Dynamics ofArgument, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
423 (2001).
3 Rawls himselfhas twice attempted to make his proposals more concrete by tying them to particular
debates. Neither attempt was particularly successful, in my view, because he focused on the "bottom line"
position being defended, rather than the nature of the arguments put forward on its behalf. In a footnote in
Political Liberalism, he implied that those who argued that abortion should be impermissible during the
first trimester were violating the canons ofpublic reason. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 243 n.32
(1993). After heavy criticism, he minimized the status of this example in his article in the University of
Chicago Law Review, stating that the footnote merely expressed his opinion, and was not intended as an
argument about the nature of public reason. John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI.
L. REV. 765, 798 n.80. Nonetheless, he made a similarly abbreviated and controversial claim about
arguments against gay marriage, implying that arguments meeting the constraints ofpublic reason could not
support a position limiting marriage to heterosexual couples. Id. at 788 n.60. The requirements of"public
reason" are clearly no more than a thin veil for politically motivated censorship once they are used to rule
out positions themselves, rather than constrain the arguments used to support those positions.
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depth and texture of the rich and diverse traditions of moral reflection that are
the heritage of the American experience? Would there be a way to forge a
common vocabulary for substantive moral reflection, or would the discussion
inevitably focus on procedural issues, hammering out fair decision-making
procedures among moral strangers?
Human Cloning and Human Dignity exemplifies the possibility of
conducting a sustained and vigorous argument about a controversial moral
issue that is simultaneously public and substantively rich. Although several
members of the Commission are well-known for their commitment to a
religious worldview, no specifically religious arguments are proffered for or
against either type of cloning considered in the Report. At the same time, the
considerations adduced go beyond the typical utilitarian or rights-based
justifications of policy analysis in a pluralistic society. Particularly
interesting is the discussion of parental responsibilities to children and the
manner in which the practice of cloning can occlude clear recognition of those
responsibilities. The Council argues that successful child-rearing requires
parents to accept their children as "gifts" and "blessings," rather than seeing
them as "products" of our own desires. If we see children as products
designed to our own specifications, we are unlikely to see them as beings
equal in dignity with ourselves. Because it allows parents to specify the entire
genetic makeup of their child, the Council fears that cloning is more akin to
"making" a child in accordance with standards of production than "begetting"
a child as a mysterious blessing and responsibility.
The terms "gifts" and "blessings," as well as the contrast between
"making" and "begetting," are dense in meaning; they draw upon and point
back to a wide range of literary texts and social practices, both religious and
non-religious. They evoke an affective as well as an intellectual response on
the part of the reader, encouraging him or her to adopt a particular existential
stance toward the subject matter they are being invoked to describe. The
Report, in my view, achieves its objective of combining public accessibility
and richness by expanding the relevant texts and modes of persuasion beyond
those customarily relied upon in contemporary philosophy and political
theory. The insights available from literature are equally important to the
Council, as evident from the recent publication of Being Human: Readings
from the President's Council of Bioethics.32 The volume includes excerpts
from Gulliver's Travels, Peter Pan, and War and Peace, as well as selections
from the Bible and classical philosophy.
Rooted in a particular tradition, these texts nonetheless have an
32 See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 4, at 110-13.
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intelligibility that transcends their initial audience. As the theologian David
Tracy has argued, texts such as these are "classics"; they are simultaneously
firmly groundced in their own time and place, yet able to exert an
intellectually and existentially compelling claim for consideration and
reinterpretation by those of us living in other times and places. "When the
text is a classic," writes Tracy, "I am also recognizing that its 'excess of
meaning' both demands constant interpretation and bears a certain kind of
timelessness-namely the timelessness of a classic expression rooted in its own
historical time and calling to my own historicity."
33
The "public reason" debate has largely been conducted with the
assumption that the particularity of the sources used by a conversation partner
is inevitably incompatible with broad intelligibility. In other words, it has
generally equated particularity with insularity. Tracy's reflections on the
nature of a "classic" calls these assumptions into question, suggesting ways in
which deep insight into the human condition may be historically and
culturally particular yet capable of touching the minds and hearts of persons
from other times and places. Human Cloning and Human Dignity provides an
example of what conversation about a controverted moral issue might look
like that is both public and rich, because it tacitly draws upon the same
understanding of a "classic" that David Tracy articulates. Consequently, it is
worthy of sustained attention by theorists of "public reason."
V. JURISPRUDENCE AND POLICY
Despite the fact that the Report emphasizes its commitment to exploring
the full moral implications of human cloning, it devotes very little time to
jurisprudential issues, which are centrally concerned with the morality of
lawmaking. Unfortunately, for this reason, the two chapters on public policy
are the least academically satisfying portion of the Report. The introductory
paragraph to Chapter Seven, which outlines a variety of policy options, begins
in a promising way by raising the relevant jurisprudential questions. It notes,
for example, that "[w]hether and how the law should address any given
morally charged topic is often a debatable matter, requiring careful study and
prudent judgment. Not everything that is morally defensible should be
encouraged by public policy; not everything that is morally troubling should
be legally proscribed. 34 Nonetheless, despite this promising beginning, the
chapter includes almost no nuanced and sustained analysis of the morally
33 DAVID TRACY, THE ANALOGICAL IMAGINATION 102 (1981).
3 PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, supra note 4, at 173.
20041
Journal of Law & Politics
appropriate relationship between morality and law in the case of human
cloning.
This lacuna is unfortunate, because it marks a lost opportunity for an
important conversation. Following in the tradition of John Stuart Mill, many
liberal legal theorists have argued that it is immoral for the state to use
criminal prohibitions to deter an act that does not harm another person in a
more-or-less tangible way. According to Joel Feinberg, one of the most
rigorous and influential of such theorists, acts that are harmful to a another
person's moral character, or that in the aggregate result in a morally inferior
social ethos, should not be prohibited, especially with the harsh sanctions of
the criminal law. In my view, by resting its judgment that human cloning-to-
produce-children could legitimately be prohibited upon the high potential for
physical harm (and expressing skepticism about the legitimacy of prohibiting
such cloning on other grounds)," the Clinton Commission tacitly relied on a
liberal legal theory very similar to Feinberg's.36 Furthermore, the Clinton
Commission suggested that, should reproductive cloning ever be deemed safe
and effective, it might very well be protected by a constitutional right to
privacy, which it interpreted not only to cover a woman's negative right to be
free of the burdens of childbearing, but also as possibly to include a positive
right to have a child, with technological assistance if necessary.
37
But the jurisprudential arguments of the Clinton Commission are far from
unassailable.38 There are other legal theories which place a high value on
human freedom, but which also emphasize the positive steps that a society
must take in order to promote and protect autonomy rather than merely
focusing upon the negative requirements harm principle. Joseph Raz, for
example, has argued that the exercise of human autonomy has three
fundamental requirements, which must be protected and nurtured by society
as a whole: 1) the raw mental capacity to make and carry out choices; 2)
freedom from attempts at manipulation as well as coercion on the part of other
people; and 3) a range of morally worthwhile choices from which to choose.3 9
One could make a strong argument that a society that values liberty will
legally prohibit cloning-to-produce children because it threatens to undermine
all three of Raz's criteria for the exercise of human autonomy. Even if such
cloning were proven to be physically safe (and thus the first criteria were
eliminated from consideration), the second and third criteria would still justify
35 See NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 8, at 87 (summary).
36 See Kaveny, supra note 15.
31 See NATIONAL BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 8, at 93-95.
38 See Kaveny, supra note 15.
39 See JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 369-99 (1986).
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a legal prohibition.
Moreover, the constitutional interpretation of the Clinton Commission
would also have been worthy of explicit consideration and challenge by the
Bush Council. The Supreme Court has never given constitutional protection
to a positive right to reproductive liberty4°; one can make a strong case that
the Court should not interpret the right to privacy (which is based in bodily
integrity) so broadly as to include a right to produce a cloned child in a
laboratory.
In short, the chapters of the Report devoted to policy and law are far less
intellectually well-developed than they ideally would have been. The focus of
these chapters is almost entirely functional; they are devoted almost
exclusively to considering what scheme of law and policy would be most
effective in implementing the moral conclusions regarding cloning that were
reached earlier in the Report. Almost no consideration is given to the
additional moral issues raised by the prospect of implementing moral
judgments using the coercive force of law, in a pluralistic society in general
and in our constitutional democracy in particular.
VI. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the gaps in its jurisprudential analysis, however, Human
Cloning and Human Dignity is a fine document. Despite the rigor and care
with which the arguments for and against human cloning are presented, its
most important contribution lies in its general form, not in its particular
substance. The Report exemplifies the possibility of sustained and vigorous
moral discourse about a controversial issue, a discourse that is both deeply
textured and capable of resonating with persons coming from a variety of
religious and ethical perspectives. It thereby gives our democratic, pluralistic
society grounds to hope in the possibility of a common conversation, not only
in the realm of bioethics, but also with respect to other ethical challenges
confronting our nation.
40 The Clinton Commission relies upon a lone district court case, Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F.Supp.
1361 (N.D. I11. 1990), affd without opinion sub nom. Scholberg v. Lifchez, 914 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1990).
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